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Abstract: This study attempts to investigate the issue of  the existence of  institutional herding in the 
stock market. The existence is detected in the intraday trade data from the Indonesia Stock Exchange 
(IDX) during up, down, and stable market condition over the period 2003-2005. By using the model 
of  Lakonishok et al. (1992), it is found that the intensity of  the existence of  institutional herding at 
the IDX, on average, is 8.4 percent. Institutional investors do not seem to lead their transactions in 
a certain characteristic of  stock. Most of  them follow positive-feedback trading strategy while others 
follow negative-feedback trading strategy. This study also found that the existence of  herd behavior at 
the IDX did not destabilize the market price in a subsequent period. 
Abstrak: Studi ini mencoba meneliti isu keberadaan perilaku pengikutan investor institusional di pasar 
saham. Keberadaannya dideteksi dalam data perdagangan intraharian dari Bursa Efek Indonesia (BEI) 
selama kondisi pasar naik, turun dan pasar stabil pada perioda 2003-2005. Dengan menggunakan model 
Lakonishok et al. (1992), ditemukan bahwa intensitas keberadaan perilaku pengikutan institusional di BEI 
rata-rata adalah 8,4 persen. Investor institusional nampaknya tidak mengarahkan perdagangan mereka 
dalam saham berkarakteristik tertentu. Sebagian besar dari mereka mengikuti strategi perdagangan umpan 
balik positif, sementara yang lainnya mengikuti strategi perdagangan umpan balik negatif. Studi ini juga 
menemukan bahwa keberadaan perilaku pengikutan di BEI tidak mengacaukan harga pasar saham pada 
perioda berikutnya.
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Introduction
Since the beginning of  the 1990s herd-
ing has already been empirically identified to 
exist in the stock markets both in developed 
countries such as U.S, Japan, Australia and 
in developing countries such as India and 
Indonesia. Herding is shown to be a pattern 
of  mass behavior that results from the inter-
actions among individuals.
This behavior was formerly assumed to 
occur only when the market was in a condition 
of  information asymmetry and highly volatil-
ity (Alchian 1950), as would happened when 
an economy was in crisis and when a market 
was fluctuating extremely. Nevertheless, such 
behavior is also found when the market is in 
a stable condition. Hwang and Salmon (2004) 
surprisingly found that the occurrence of  
this behavior is more frequent during a stable 
market than during a market under pressure. 
As said by Hwang and Salmon (2004), a mar-
ket cannot be free from the herding behav-
ior, and the issue surrounding this behavior 
concerns its changing intensity from time to 
time. So it is reasonable to detect the exis-
tence of  herding behavior in whatever mar-
ket condition.
The existence of  herding behavior of  
both domestic and foreign investors at the 
Indonesia Stock Exchange, IDX (ex-JSX) has 
been detected using daily data by Neal et al. 
(2002) and Bowe and Domuta (2004) during 
the period of  Asian crisis in 1997. The stud-
ies also found that both domestic and foreign 
investors engaged in herding behavior, and 
the existence did not destabilize the market 
prices of  the stocks during the subsequent 
period. This research is intended to detect 
the existence of  the herding behavior at the 
IDX with a number of  differences especially 
concerning the period, subject, and type of  
the data used.
This research focuses on the institu-
tional investors’ behavior. The subject is cho-
sen due to the fact that this type of  investor 
has been proven to have order in the strategy 
of  trading i.e. trading by following the herd 
(Sias 2001). The existence of  the herding be-
havior of  the institutional investors, in this 
research, is detected during a long period of  
time either when the market condition was 
rising, falling, or steady. That long period of  
time enables an observation to be made of  
the changes of  intensity of  the herding from 
time to time. 
This research also observes whether the 
herding is directed at securities with similar 
characteristics and whether the institutional 
investors follow trends or follow both posi-
tive and negative feedback-trading strategies. 
This kind of  investor is often suspected as be-
ing informed-traders who tend to follow the 
trend and follow themselves, besides herding 
with each other, inside and outside of  the se-
curities with similar characteristics (Sias 2001; 
and Chakravarty 2001). Furthermore, this re-
search also observes what the tendency of  
the stocks’ market prices is during the period 
after the stocks are traded with the herding.
During the period 2003-2005 at the 
IDX, based on the model of  Lakonishok et 
al. (1992), it was found that the intensity of  
institutional herding was 8.4 percent on aver-
age. The intensity of  the herding initiated by 
the sellers was stronger than that initiated by 
the buyers. Those institutional traders were 
not obviously directed at the stocks with cer-
tain characteristics (risks, company size, and 
past performance). Some institutional inves-
tors followed the positive-feedback trading 
strategy and some others followed the neg-
ative-feedback trading strategy. The intensity 
of  the herding varied in accordance with the 
passing time, and consistently in line with 
the findings of  Hwang and Salmon (2004), 
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which say that the stronger intensity tends 
to occur when the market is more stable. 
Abnormal returns within the subsequent pe-
riod was found to be non-monotonic; there-
fore, it cannot necessarily be said that it was 
evidence of  price reversal as the consequence 
of  the institutional investors choosing the 
herding strategy in their stock trading.
The remainder of  this is organized 
as follows. Part B explains the literature re-
view and hypothesis on institutional herding, 
and the effects of  herding on subsequential 
prices. Part C presents the research method 
containing the reports on data and samples, 
herding measurement, and means difference 
test. The empirical testing along with its re-
sults is presented in Part D. Part E contains 
the conclusion.
Literature Review and 
Hypotheses
Herding Models
From a rational viewpoint, the existence 
of  herding behavior in a stock market can 
be explained through one or more of  three 
mechanisms: informational externality, pay-
off  externality, and reputation or compensa-
tion (Devenov and Welch 1996). Those three 
mechanisms, which become the reasons why 
an individual behaves in that way in decision 
making, can be separately explained by using 
three models of  rational herding: (i) informa-
tional based herding, (ii) informational acqui-
sition herding and (iii) reputation and com-
pensation based herding.
Informational Based Herding
When decision-making is complement-
ed by a volatile condition and imperfect in-
formation, an information transmission be-
tween individuals is needed to increase the 
knowledge about the environment condition 
that affects a decision making. Herding be-
havior is often chosen to obtain the effect of  
informational externality. Considering that 
herding behavior can be carried out by ob-
serving the interacting individuals, an infor-
mation transmission is then assumed to have 
already occurred. Furthermore, as this herd-
ing model sees that inter-individual learning 
in information searching as being important, 
therefore, the informational based herding 
model is also called a social learning model.
Banerjee (1992) calls this social learning 
model herd behavior and Bikhchandani et 
al. (1992) call it informational cascades. This 
model is constructed based on the assump-
tion that an individual only receives private 
signals and action signals of  the predecessors, 
but cannot learn private signals and the past 
payoffs of  the predecessors. According to 
this model, herding behavior occurs when an 
individual can observe in sequential trading 
the predecessor’s actions, and then he makes 
a decision or acts by imitating the predeces-
sor’s actions without considering the private 
information he has.
In the beginning, a social learning mod-
el ignores the importance of  verbal commu-
nication. This model only admits that infor-
mation obtained by observing someone else’s 
actions is more credible; in other words, ac-
tions speak louder than words. Consequently, 
this results in an inefficient decision. The 
opinion on this old herding model then 
changes because the behavior involving ob-
serving the actions of  other interacting indi-
viduals, basically, involves a process of  direct 
communication and discussion among indi-
viduals. Automatically, an extensive informa-
tion transmission may occur and the amount 
of  information owned by a group increases. 
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In other words, a verbal communication 
becomes very important in the process of  
information transmission. The social learn-
ing model taking verbal communication as 
something very important is also called a so-
cial learning model through a conversation or 
word-of-mouth learning model.
With an assumption that there are com-
munications and discussions in a decision-
making process, an individual is considered 
able to observe not only actions but also 
the past payoff  (Ellison and Fudenberg 
1993, 1995; and Banerjee and Fudenberg 
2004) and the predecessor’s private signals 
(Bikhchandani et al. 1998). Based on this as-
sumption, the decision made with herding is 
efficient. Moreover, a more accurate decision 
will be achieved if  the payoff  resulting from 
a certain action can observed in the next pe-
riod (Cao and Hirshleifer 2000). 
Informational Acquisition Herding
Herding behavior can also probably be 
explained by the existence of  the payoff  ex-
ternality effect, which is a payoff  increase as 
the result of  the increasing number of  other 
investors conducting the same actions. The 
effects can be shown when all of  the in-
formed investors receive information at the 
same time and decide to direct either the 
selling or buying to similar assets. The philo-
sophical basis of  this behavior model is that 
an informed investor will become better-off  
only when trading by following information 
sources used by other informed investors but 
by ignoring fundamental information he has 
already had.
This herding model emphasizing the 
payoff  externality effects is proposed by 
Froot et al. (1992) and Hirshleifer et al. (1994) 
and is named informational acquisition herd-
ing. This model counts the differences when 
information is attained by informed investors. 
The market, whose investors receive infor-
mation at different times, has a fundamental-
ly different balance compared to the market 
whose investors receive simultaneous infor-
mation. In that kind of  market, the more ag-
gressive informed investors will enjoy a larger 
profit than the late informed investors will. 
In order to also get profit, the late informed 
investors apply a strategy of  following the 
behavior of  the earlier informed investors. In 
simple words, this model states that informed 
investors can follow each other when trading 
in a stock market.
Reputation and Compensation Based 
Herding
A personal stake in herding behavior 
comes up when there is no perfect informa-
tion in the market. In such a condition, an 
investor may or may not follow another in-
vestor’s action due to a vested interest, for ex-
ample to keep or achieve reputation, career, 
or certain compensation. Herding behav-
ior driven by a personal stake on reputation 
has been identified by Scharfstein and Stein 
(1990), Zwiebel (1995) and Prendergast and 
Stole (1996). This model is based on a notion 
that in a certain situation a manager will fol-
low other managers’ investment decisions by 
ignoring his private information when put-
ting his reputation or career on stake.
Unlike the arguments of  reputation 
based herding theory, Brennan (1993) em-
phasizes the importance of  compensation in 
the contract making between the agent and 
the principal as the basis for developing the 
theory of  herding. The idea that a principal 
may deal with an agent’s uncertainty of  ability 
in making a right decision becomes the basis 
for developing this herding model. Empirical 
evidence supports the theory is shown by 
Maug and Naik (1995), stating that the per-
formance rules, such as incentive for good 
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performing agents (to reduce any agency 
conflicts), explicitly set by the principal can 
bring about herding behavior in the agents. 
The informed agents may ignore their private 
information and follow the other probably 
uninformed agents in order to comply with 
the rules set by the principals.
Institutional Investors
Generally, institutional investors are 
the informed traders who prefer to engage 
in herding in their stock trading. It means 
that these people follow each other in trading 
the same stocks. Moreover, they also follow 
the trend or themselves in trading the same 
stocks (Chakravarty 2001; and Sias 2001). In 
this research, it is a general hypothesis that in-
stitutional investors prefer to engage in herd-
ing. The literature review presented in this 
part aims to give explanation as a theoretical 
basis in developing specific hypotheses, trig-
gered by the previous general hypothesis.
The Existence of Institutional 
Herding
Observing the institutional herding be-
havior is not generally conducted when the 
market is in a state of  high uncertainty, even 
though Patterson and Sharma (2004) keep 
choosing this condition. These behaviors are 
found in various markets such as in U.S, by 
Lakonishok et al. (1992), Wermers (1999), 
and Jones et al. (1999), in Japan by Iihara et 
al. (2001) and Hanafi (2003), and in India by 
Batra (2003). In the U.S stock market within 
different periods the existence of  herding 
with different intensity is found. Lakonishok 
et al. (1992) find that the intensity reaches 2.7 
percent average, while Wermers (1999) and 
Jones et al. (1999), find each of  3.4 and 1.6 
percent.
What has been said by Hwang and 
Salmon (2004) can possibly be true that a 
market is not perfectly free from the exis-
tence of  herding. During a certain period, the 
intensity can possibly be higher, similar to, or 
lower than another period. It is assumed that 
the existence of  herding is not in line with 
the market uncertainty, or its existence is not 
positively related to the market volatility. It is 
hypothesized that the institutional investors 
engage in herding when trading stocks at the 
IDX, and the intensity can change over time.
The Herding Towards the Security 
Characteristics
It is assumed that the institutional in-
vestors tend to trade stocks having simi-
lar characteristics. Falkenstein (1996) and 
Gompers and Metrick (2001) have observed 
the demand of  stocks by institutional inves-
tors based on various characteristics such as 
price per share, liquidity, firm size, the num-
ber of  papers mentioning the names of  cer-
tain companies, the length of  period of  the 
companies listed on the market, return vola-
tility (level of  risk), book to market value ra-
tio, and the past performance, etc.
This research focuses on some variables 
of  the stocks’ characteristics, i.e. the level of  
risk, past performance, and firm size. Similar 
findings have been shown by Falkenstein 
(1996) and Gompers and Metrick (2001) 
that institutional investors prefer more risky 
stocks. Nevertheless, the preference of  insti-
tutional investors towards smaller stocks and 
good past performance found by Falkenstein 
(1996) cannot be found in the research of  
Gompers and Metrick (2001). According to 
the study of  Gompers and Metrick (2001), 
institutional investors prefer larger stocks 
with bad past performance. Despite the con-
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tradiction between these two findings con-
cerning the investors’ preference towards the 
size of  the firm and the past performance, 
the previous researches (see Lakonishok et al. 
1992; Wermers 1999; and Sias 2001) support 
the idea that institutional investors prefer the 
smaller companies’ stocks with good past 
performance. The stocks with certain char-
acteristics (risk, size, and past performance) 
that become the preference are supposed to 
be traded with a higher intensity of  herding 
than those not becoming the preference. It 
is assumed that the intensity of  the existence 
of  herding-buy is higher on the stocks with 
high-risk, small-size, and  good past perfor-
mance, vice versa. 
Trend Following
The institutional investors often follow 
the trends in trading at the market. This is 
found in almost every observed market. They 
tend to buy the stocks with good past perfor-
mance and sell those with bad past perfor-
mance, or follow a positive-feedback trading 
strategy. In the U.S stock market, this kind 
of  trading can be seen in the studies by for 
example Lakonishok,  et al. (1992), Jones et 
al. (1999), Nofsinger and Sias (1999) and Sias 
(2001). In Asian stock markets, this strategy 
can also be found in Japan (Iihara et al. 2001) 
and in India (Batra 2003). 
Besides following the positive-feedback 
strategy, institutional investors also prefer 
to adopt a contrarian strategy, that is buying 
stocks after the price per share decreases and 
sell them after the price per share increases. 
(Bozcuk and Lasfer 2005). Such a trading 
strategy is also followed by informed traders 
and presented in the research by Brennan and 
Cao (1996). These researches explain that the 
strategy to follow the trend conducted by in-
stitutional investors can possibly be either the 
positive-feedback trading strategy, or nega-
tive-feedback trading/contrarian strategy. It 
is assumed that institutional investors pre-
fer to follow the trend in their trading strat-
egy and prefer to choose a positive-feedback 
strategy as shown by previous various find-
ings. They buy stocks with good past perfor-
mance more often than buying stocks with 
bad past performance.
Institutional Investor Return
According to Hartono (2008: 511), in a 
market in which some of  the investors have 
more information and some others do not, 
there will not be any difference between ab-
normal return enjoyed by some informed 
investors and that enjoyed by uninformed in-
vestors. The informed investors enjoy more 
abnormal return because the stocks are pur-
chased below the equilibrium price at a cer-
tain time, and sold at the new equilibrium 
price at the next time.
Institutional investors are thought to 
have better capability in searching, analyzing, 
and interpreting the information (Kraus and 
Stoll 1972a), along with their sophisticated 
ways (Gompers and Metrick 2001). People 
also believe that they have much better capa-
bility than do individual investors in engaging 
in diversification. When there is asymmetrical 
information and some unsophisticated inves-
tors, the equilibrium price will be still below 
the true equilibrium price. The institutional 
investors who can analyze and interpret the 
information correctly will respond appro-
priately by buying the cheap stocks and then 
selling them when the price shows a new 
equilibrium. As a result, those institutional 
investors take the benefit of  the abnormal 
return, while the others do not. 
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Reversal or Continuation 
 When the institutional investors 
choose a positive-feedback strategy along 
with their herding behaviors at a certain level, 
it is assumed that this has the potential to 
suppress the market to make the prices unsta-
ble. This may happen due to the fact that the 
behavior causes excess demand for certain 
stocks i.e. those with good past performance. 
If  the demand is not based on appropriate 
information, the stock prices are thought to 
have reversal in the subsequent period.
Testing the hypothesis that institutional 
trading drives the price reversal shows the re-
sult that this hypothesis does not have any 
support from the data observed. Although 
there is relatively minor evidence on the exis-
tence of  herding and positive-feedback trad-
ing, Lakonishok et al. (1992) are incapable 
of  providing sufficient data to support the 
hypothesis. The continuation of  the market 
price in the subsequent period may reflect the 
informationally efficient market condition.
It is suspected that institutional trad-
ing has a valuable information signal. A large 
instance of  trading is thought of  as being 
more informative due to having information 
signals about the company’s prospects, than 
a small trading which is regarded as having 
less information as to balance the investor’s 
portfolio (Scholes 1972; and Kraus and Stoll 
1972b). The large buying conducted by in-
stitutional traders is suspected of  increasing 
the price because the trading contains private 
information. On the other hand, it is also as-
sumed that a large instance of  selling causes 
negative price reaction due to the fact that 
the trading carries information showing that 
the prospects of  the company are negative 
(Bozcuk and Lasfer 2005). If  a large trade has 
information, the market price is supposed to 
be influenced by excess demand and excess 
supply at the previous time. The higher the 
excess demand on a certain kind of  stock, 
the more the stock market will increase in the 
subsequent period; and the higher the excess 
supply on a certain kind of  stock, the more 
the stock market will increase in the subse-
quent period.
Research Method
Data and Samples
This research tests some data samples 
of  companies’ stock transactions listed on 
the Indonesia Stock Exchange (IDX) during 
the period 2003-2005. The raw data needed 
for this study are the intradaily data. The 
general criterion for the companies to be in-
cluded in these research samples is the data 
availability. The companies must provide data 
such as intradaily transaction data to cover 
dates, prices, volume, kinds of  trading, and 
daily closing stock prices. Two other specific 
criteria to be fulfilled by the companies con-
cern their being active in making transactions 
and the existence of  block trade. 
Herding Measurement
In this paper, measuring the variable 
of  the existence of  herding is conducted 
by applying the procedure developed by 
Lakonishok et al. (1992) and combined with 
Wermers (1999). This aims to find out the 
weekly intensity of  institutional (block)1 
1 As applied by Kraus, and Stoll (1972b), and Holthausen et al. (1987, 1990), the institutional trade is repre-
sented by block trade, that is, a trade at least 50.000 shares.
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herding during the period 2003-2005. The 
first step is estimating the buyer-initiation 
and seller-initiation by reducing the present 
price with the previous price (Lee and Ready 
1991). The measuring process using a model 
of  Lakonishok et al. (1992) is as follows. 
1. Determine the proportion of  block inves-
tors buying stock (i) in the week (t)
 [ ]
B(i, t )p( i, t )
B( i, t ) S( i, t )
=
+   (1)
2. Determine the proportion of  block inves-
tors buying stocks at IDX in the week (t)
       
it
it it
i N
i 1
i N i N
i 1 i 1
B( i, t )
p(t )
B( i, t ) S( i, t )
=
=
= =
= =
=
 
+ 
 
∑
∑ ∑
      
(2)
3. Determine the adjustment factor
       { })t(p)t,i(pE)t,i(AF −=       (3)
4. Calculate the herding intensity on stock (i) 
in the week (t)
       )t,i(AF)t(p)t,i(p)t,i(H −−=     (4)
5. Calculate the herding intensity at IDX 
in the week (t) by averaging H(i,t) that 
calculated across all samples per week.
A number of  notations in equation (1) 
through (4) is defined as follow:
a. B(i,t) is number of  block investors buying 
stock (i) in the week (t);
b. S(i,t) is number of  block investors selling 
stock (i) in the week (t);
c. p(t) is the expected proportion of  block 
investors buying in that week relative to 
the number of  active block investors, it is 
aggregated from entirely stock;
d. AF(i,t) is adjustment factor determined 
by considering the fact that under null hy-
pothesis of  no herding;
e. Nit is number of  stocks traded at least one 
block investor in the week (t);
f. p(i,t) is the proportion of  block investors 
buying stock (i) in the week (t);
g.	 p(i,t) - p(t) is excess buying or excess 
selling of  stock (i) from the average of  
block buying or block selling in the week 
(t).
After the intensity of  herding is mea-
sured, stocks in a certain period can be divid-
ed into three groups, i.e. stocks bought with 
herding, stocks sold with herding, and stocks 
not traded with herding. The stocks not trad-
ed with herding are those having negative 
H(i,t) and stocks without herding. To deter-
mine whether herding is initiated by buyers 
(BH) or initiated by sellers (SH), the criteria 
constructed by Wermers (1999) are applied, 
with the herding rule:
 BH (i,t) = H(i,t)| p(it) > p(t), and 
 SH (it) = H(i,t) | p(it) < p(t)
Mean Difference Test
Some hypotheses constructed in this 
paper need the mean difference test tech-
nique to test them. The test comparing the 
average of  2 samples will be applied by using 
an independent sample test method (t-test), 
the average of  the pair will be tested by using 
a pair samples test method, and the average 
of  more than 2 samples will be tested by us-
ing the ANOVA method.
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Result
Market Condition
The market condition during 2003-
2005, as reflected by the fluctuation of  mar-
ket index returns, can be seen in Figure 1. 
The market return fluctuated with the highest 
average rise reaching 13.90 percent in January 
2004, and the lowest average rise reaching 
1.35 percent in February 2004. Meanwhile, 
the highest average fall reached 8.30 percent 
in May 2004, and the lowest average fall was 
0.38 percent in August 2003.
Figure 1 shows the market fluctuating 
condition. This market volatility is shown by 
the market index returns either above or be-
low the original value. During the research, 
this market index volatility was signaling 
a volatility of  the market condition and is 
statistically shown through the value of  the 
Figure 1. Market Return Period of  Years 2003-2005
standard deviation of  0.02655 of  0.00683 
as the average value. The highest return of  
the market index is 0.08391, which occurs in 
the fourth week of  December 2003, and the 
lowest is 0.08764, which occurs in the fourth 
week of  April 2004. Of  the 153 observed 
weeks, there are 16 dates showing an extreme 
market fluctuation. A market is said to be 
‘rising’ only when, within those dates, it has 
market returns that stay in the highest 8 (5% 
of  the weekly return data distribution), and 
is said to be ‘falling’ when the market returns 
stay in the lowest 8. 
Some statistical values resulting from 
the description of  the market return data in-
dicate that the condition of  the market covers 
quiet market (the market return is minimum 
close to zero), up-market (the market return 
is positive), and down-market (the market re-
turn is negative). Therefore, the stock market 
condition at the IDX is a perfect setting for 
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detecting the herding behavior in price deci-
sion making as required by this study.
Institutional Herding Existence
By using the model of  Lakonishok et 
al. (1992), the detection of  herding towards 
1.875 stocks found that there were 756 stocks 
traded by way of  herding. Table 1 shows the 
average intensity of  institutional herding 
reaches 8.4 percent. The intensity of  herd-
ing initiated by institutional buyers upon 353 
stocks has an average of  7.7 percent. This is 
lower than the intensity of  herding initiated 
by institutional sellers, which reaches an aver-
age of  9.1 percent, occurring on 403 stocks. 
Using quarterly data in U.S, this stron-
ger herding initiated by sellers is also detected 
by Wermers (1999). The existence of  herding 
found in the IDX daily data is also detected 
by Neal et al. (2002) and Bowe and Domuta 
Table 1. Existence of  Institutional Herding 
Existence of  institutional herding is detected from intraday transaction data at IDX period of  years 2003-2005. The 
existence of  herding can be expressed as the intensity value estimated by using a Lakonishok et al. (1992) model. 
The average intensity of  herding existence is reported, both for all samples and each trade side: buy-side and sell-
side. Standard errors are reported along with their means in parentheses. Whether the existence is initiated by buyer 
(BH) or seller (SH) determined by using a Wermers (1999) rule:
Variable Herding Intensity
Buyer Initiated 
Herding Intensity
Seller Initiated 
Herding Intensity 
Mean (std. deviation) 0.084 (0.083) 0.077 (0.079) 0.091 (0.086)
Observation (n) 756 353 403
 
Estimation result of  the intensity of  herding existence for each stock is not shown in this paper.
(2004), in which herding is conducted by both 
domestic and foreign investors. The existence 
of  herding found in this research signals that 
the behavior of  institutional investors at the 
IDX resemble informed agents. They follow 
each other in stocks trading.
The results of  detecting herding at the 
IDX during the period of  the research show 
that herding behavior takes place not only 
when the market has an extreme fluctuating 
condition, but also when the market is sta-
ble. The results of  the means difference test 
show that the intensity of  herding in a mar-
ket during an extreme fluctuating condition is 
lower than that during the time in which the 
market does not experience extreme changes 
(Table 2 Panel A). In an extremely changing 
condition, the average intensity of  herding is 
as much as 0.066, and it is lower than 0.087 
when the market is not experiencing an ex-
treme change.
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These findings seem to be evidence 
supporting the statement of  Hwang and 
Salmon (2004) that there will be no market 
perfectly free from the existence of  herding, 
and the intensity of  its existence varies from 
time to time. Table 2 Panel B presents the re-
sult of  ANOVA. At the level of  significance 
of  1 percent, there is a variety of  herding 
intensity during the period of  this research. 
The intensity of  herding decreases annually 
with the highest intensity as high as 0.0388 
occurring in 2003, and the lowest intensity 
was 0.0293 in 2005.
Table 2. Mean difference test results
Panel A presents the result of  mean difference tests for the intensity of  herding between two subsets of  market 
conditions: extremely volatile and stable. Panel B presents the result of  mean difference tests for the intensity of  
herding according to period of  time changes: 2003, 2004 and 2005. Standard errors are reported along with their 
means in parentheses. Existence of  herding is expressed as the institutional herding intensity estimated by using a 
Lakonishok et al. (1992) model. 
Test Condition – Category N Mean (S.E)
Panel A. Mean difference test
Market condition Extremely volatile 105 0.066 (0.0066)
Stable 651 0.087 (0.0033)
Levene’s statistic 9.019***
t-test 2.508***
Panel B. ANOVA
Year 2003 46 0.040 (0.0018)
2004 44 0.037 (0.0017)
2005 35 0.029 (0.0016)
Levene’s statistic 1.631
t-test 7.112***
*** Significant at the 1 percent level.
Characteristic Based Herding 
Table 3 shows the results of  the mean 
difference tests for the herding intensity ac-
cording to stock characteristics: firm size, 
risk, and past performance of  stocks. During 
the research, the institutional investors at the 
IDX do not seem to have a monotonous 
preference with regard to the firm size. The 
results of  the mean difference test that have 
not been uploaded in this paper show that the 
herding intensity of  buying blocks is higher 
on small and large stocks, and the herding in-
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tensity of  buying blocks is lower on medium 
stocks. There is a similar tendency on the sell-
ing side, though it is not statistically significant. 
These findings seems to justify the previous 
findings both that the institutional prefers 
small stocks (Falkenstein 1996), and vice versa 
(Gompers and Metrick 2001). Institutional 
investors might not have monotonous prefer-
ence for either large or small stocks.
Meanwhile, seen from the characteris-
tics of  the risk level, their trading prefers the 
low risk stocks. This finding is different from 
the previous findings stating that institutional 
investors prefer stocks with high variation of  
return (Falkenstein 1996; and Gompers and 
Metrick 2001). This institutional behavior is 
rational in order to avoid a relatively big loss 
if  the high-risk stocks are chosen.
Table 3. Mean difference test results
This table presents the result of  mean difference tests for the intensity of  herding according to stock characteristics: 
firm size, risk, and past performance of  stock. Standard errors are reported along with their means in parentheses. 
Existence of  herding is expressed as the institutional herding intensity estimated by using a Lakonishok et al. (1992) 
model. Whether the existence is initiated by buyer (BH) or seller (SH) determined by using a Wermers (1999) rule:
BH(i,t) = H(it)|p(i,t) > p(t), and SH(i,t)=H(i,t) <p(t)
Firm size is measured by a market capitalization value. Risk is measured by a beta coefficient that estimated by using 
a market model. Past performance is measured by a value of  previous abnormal return. 
Category Firm Size Risk Past Performance
Buyer Initiated Herding
Low 0.088 (0.008) 0.098 (0.010) 0.079 (0.007)
Medium 0.069 (0.007) 0.082 (0.007) 0.076 (0.007)
High 0.094 (0.010) 0.072 (0.007) 0.074 (0.007)
Levene Statistic 2.41* 5.23*** 0.72
t-test 2.77* 2.23* 0.17
Observation (n) 344 344 337
Seller Initiated Herding
Low 0.088 (0.007) 0.100 (0.010) 0.094 (0.008)
Medium 0.084 (0.007) 0.086 (0.007) 0.094 (0.008)
High 0.086 (0.008) 0.075 (0.006) 0.072 (0.006)
Levene Statistic 0.047 4.91*** 4.24**
t-test 0.115 2.73* 3.02**
Observation (n) 396 397 399
*** Significant at the 1 percent level, ** Significant at the 5 percent level, and * Significant at the 10 percent level.
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Trend Following 
The test results not uploaded in this 
paper show an early indication that institu-
tional investors follow trends. This is clearly 
seen from the results of  the analysis on the 
intensity of  herding-buy and sell based on 
the characteristics of  the stocks’ past perfor-
mance. When viewed from the intensity of  
herding-sell, they look like positive-feedback 
traders, but when viewed from the inten-
sity of  herding-buy, they also like negative-
feedback trading. Though statistically it is 
not significant, this finding is also consistent 
with what is obtained from the means dif-
ference test of  excess-demand represented 
by D-ratio and N-ratio. Most institutional 
investors choose the positive-feedback strat-
egy as shown by the highest N-ratio on the 
stocks with good past performances, and 
others choose the negative-feedback strategy 
as shown by D-ratio which is positive to the 
stocks with bad past performances (Table 4). 
The means difference D-ratio and 
N-ratio tests give different results. It is per-
haps caused by two things: a different num-
ber of  followers of  a certain strategy and a 
different trading volume. Although most 
institutional investors at the IDX prefer to 
choose a positive-feedback trading strategy, 
some institutional investors use a negative-
feedback strategy with a larger amount of  
buying. Since the negative-feedback institu-
tion makes a large trading, while the positive-
feedback institution does not do the same, 
there is then an excess-demand towards the 
stocks with bad past performances. The neg-
ative-feedback or contradictory trading strat-
egy used by institutional investors during this 
research is also done by informed institution-
al investors as detected by Brennan and Cao 
(1996) and Bozcuk and Lasfer (2005).
Table 4. Test for trend following strategies
Tests are employed by analyzing excess-demand for each stock. Mean difference of  the excess-demands are tested 
according to past performance categories. Standard errors are reported along with their means in parentheses. 
Firm performance is measured by the abnormal return, estimated as: Et = Rit – E(Rit). The excess-demand can be 
expressed as D-ratio and N-ratio. D-ratio for a given stock-week, i, can be defined as:
 [ ]
[ ]s e l ls ( i)IDRb u y s ( i)IDR
s e lls ( i)IDRb u y s ( i)IDR
ira tioD
+
−
=− )(
N-ratio for a given stock-week, i, can be defined as:
N – ratio(i) = #buys(i) / #active(i)
Past Performance D-ratio N-ratio
1 (worse) 0.0229 (0.021) 0.4665 (0.014)
2 -0.0081 (0.021) 0.4899 (0.015)
3 (best) -0.0004 (0.021) 0.5061 (0.014)
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Returns for Institutional 
Investors
Institutional trading is assumed to have 
information about the future prospect of  the 
company. Excess-demand (supply) by institu-
tional traders is suspected of  influencing the 
prices in the subsequent period. Analyzing 
the abnormal return that occurs is conducted 
to test this assumption.
In the test, there is a convincing differ-
ence between the abnormal return received 
by institutional investors and that received by 
non-institutional investors. It indicates that 
there is information asymmetry at the IDX 
during the period that the research was con-
ducted. In line with the opinion of  Kraus and 
Stoll (1972a), more information at the IDX 
is absorbed by institutional investors than is 
obtained by non-institutional investors. As a 
result, institutional investors (block) get more 
abnormal return than do the non-institution-
al investors (non-block) (see Table 5). This 
abnormal return gap justifies the institutional 
investors as the informed traders. Therefore, 
the fluctuation of  prices at the IDX during 
the research might be caused by private in-
formation rather than public information.
Besides the distribution aspect of  asym-
metry information, the return gap can possi-
bly be caused by the investors’ capability due 
to the fact that a good capability is required 
by investors to analyze as well as intepret the 
information correctly. If  they can analyze 
and interpret the information correctly, they 
will respond appropriately. Thus, no single 
investor predicts whether the stock price is 
above or below the equilibrium value. In line 
with the opinions of  Gompers and Metrick 
(2001), it seems that there is a much differ-
ent quality between two kinds of  investors 
at the IDX, and the institutional investors 
are much more qualified and capable than 
are the non-institutional investors. Because 
of  their capability in analyzing, interpreting, 
and appropriately responding to the informa-
Table 5. Test for mean difference of  abnormal returns
This table reports the mean difference of  abnormal returns received by institutional investors from those received 
by non-institutional investors. Standard errors are reported along with their means in parentheses. The abnormal 
return can be estimated as: )E(RRE ititt −= . 
Category
Mean (standard error)
All samples Positive return sample
Institutional return -0.013 (0.003) 0.049 (0.003)
Non institutional return -0.015 (0.003) 0.047 (0.002)
Difference (d) 0.001 (0.001) 0.002 (0.001)
Correlation (r) 0.97*** 0.95***
t-test 2.50*** 2.78***
Observation (n) 743 288
*** Significant at the 1 percent level.
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tion they have obtained, they can choose and 
buy the cheap stocks and then sell at the time 
when the price shows a new equilibrium. 
Consequently, those smart institutional in-
vestors can enjoy the abnormal return better 
than can the non-institutional investors when 
a new equilibrium is happening.
Reversal versus Continuation 
The negative abnormal return after a 
massive selling of  stocks is often referred to 
as selling pressure. By seeing the results of  
the analysis shown in  Table 6, one may see 
that the average current price decreases after 
an excess-demand upon stocks and increases 
after an excess-supply in the past. The excess-
demand previously followed by negative re-
turn in the subsequent period, changes to be-
come positive when the excess-demand gets 
higher. It seems that there occurs a reversal 
from this kind of  result due to the negative 
return in the subsequent period; however, it 
cannot necessarily be said that the reversal 
is caused by the noise behavior of  liquidity 
traders at IDX.
It is possible that noise behavior at the 
IDX has triggered price errors on certain 
stocks in the past, due to under-reaction to-
wards new information. The stocks having 
bad performances in the past are considered 
cheap by these noise traders. The informed 
traders (institutional investors) receive the 
same information (correlated) and interpret 
it appropriately, then perform accordingly 
(Scharfstein and Stein 1990). Together they 
buy those cheap stocks, and when there is a 
quite high excess-demand, the price will be 
corrected to the proper equilibrium value, 
close to the fundamental value.
 The abnormal return that seems un-
stable in the subsequent period after the ex-
cess-demand can be explained by the frame 
of  information hypothesis (Scholes 1972; 
and Kraus and Stoll 1972b). The excess-de-
mand towards the cheap stocks in the past 
by institutional investors can be considered 
Table 6. Test for Subsequent Price Across Excess-Demand/Excess-Supply Categories
Subsequent prices are proxied by abnormal returns. Mean difference of  current abnormal returns are tested ac-
cording to past excess-demand or excess-supply categories. Standard errors are reported along with their means 
in parentheses. The abnormal return can be estimated as: Et = Rt  – E(Rt). The excess-demand or excess-supply 
represented D-ratio, for a given stock-week, i, can be defined as:
[ ]
[ ]
IDR buys(i) IDR sells(i)
D ratio( i )
IDR buys(i) IDR sells(i)
−
− =
+
Category Excess-demand Excess-supply Excess-demand Excess-supply
N = 743 n = 618
Total -0.0002 (0.008) 0.0008 (0.005) 0.0011 (0.009) 0.0011 (0.001)
Small -0.0081 (0.003) 0.0030 (0.003) -0.0080 (0.003) 0.0009 (0.003)
Medium -0.0043 (0.002) 0.0003 (0.002) -0.0034 (0.002) 0.0019 (0.002)
Large 0.0160 (0.029) -0.0003 (0.003) 0.0193 (0.034) -0.0003 (0.003)
All mean difference of  abnormal returns across excess-demand or excess-supply categories are not significant at a 
common level (1% - 10%).
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as an event containing information signals. 
The demand curve on the loser stocks in 
fact tends to increase, but since the excess-
demand occurs on the loser stocks, so when 
the excess-demand is still low, the price is also 
low (negative abnormal return). When there 
is a high excess-demand, the prices increase in 
the herding period. This can be seen through 
the positive abnormal return due to the high 
excess-demand by institutional investors in 
the past.
The same argument applies to the 
excess-supply towards the winner stocks to 
explain the abnormal return that seems un-
stable in the subsequent period. The noise or 
irrational behavior at the IDX might possibly 
encourage price error in the past due to over-
reaction to the new information. The stocks 
appearing to have good performance in the 
past are perhaps those regarded expensive 
by the noise traders. Perhaps the institutional 
investors have received similar fundamental 
information and interpreted it accordingly, so 
that together they sell those expensive stocks 
to avoid a bigger loss. They share fear togeth-
er creating a somewhat high excess-supply in 
the past. Consequently, the stock prices are 
immediately corrected to the true equilibrium 
value, close to the fundamental value.
In the information hypothesis frame, 
the occurrence of  excess-supply by institu-
tional investors is believed to have informa-
tion signals (Scholes 1972; and Kraus and 
Stoll 1972b). Contradictory traders selling the 
winners can still enjoy their abnormal return 
when there are only a few excess-supplies to-
wards those stocks, but when there is a high 
excess-supply the prices of  the winners fall. 
These falling prices in the subsequent period 
are marked by negative abnormal return. 
By observing the pattern of  average 
abnormal return in the subsequent period, 
either after the stocks have excess-demand 
or after the stocks have excess-supply in the 
past, the results of  this analysis, though weak 
statistically, are consistent with the informa-
tion hypotheses of  institutional trading con-
structed previously by Scholes (1972) and 
Kraus and Stoll (1972b). The stock prices 
that seem to have a reversal in the subsequent 
period are not sufficient to support the evi-
dence on under-reaction and over-reaction 
happening in short term.
Conclusions
With the intradaily transaction data dur-
ing the period 2003-2005 at the IDX, this re-
search finds that the intensity of  institutional 
herding at the IDX averages 8.4 percent. 
The intensity of  herding appears stronger 
in a stable market condition. It seems that 
institutional investors at the IDX like fol-
lowing trends. Most of  them adopt a posi-
tive-feedback strategy while others adopt a 
negative-feedback strategy. The behaviors of  
institutional investors resemble the habits of  
informed agents.  
As traders resembling informed agents, 
institutional investors also get abnormal re-
turns exceeding the return received by non-
institutional investors. Institutional trading 
does not explicitly encourage the price rever-
sal because the negative abnormal returns on 
the stocks experiencing excess-demand are 
driven by under-reaction conducted by noise 
traders. This situation will immediately disap-
pear when the demand of  institutional inves-
tors gets higher.
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